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ABSTRACT

A FORMAL SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF AUTISTIC LANGUAGE: THE
QUANTIFICATION HYPOTHESIS
Michael B. Manookin
Department of Linguistics
Master of Arts

Autism is characterized by language dysfunction ranging from mild and peculiar
language usage to a total lack of expressive language function. These language oddities are
manifest in the form of phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic/
behavioral dysfunction. Research suggests that the autistic language deﬁcit is focal—dealing
with a speciﬁc area of language processing; however, previous research has failed to identify this
language enigma. This thesis demonstrates a novel approach to the problem, showing that the
autistic language deﬁcit is tied to a particular aspect of language processing—quantiﬁcation.
Quantiﬁcation is deﬁned and explained in the context of autistic language and behavior.
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CHAPTER 1: PREVIOUS WORK ON AUTISM

Autism is characterized by language dysfunction ranging from mild and peculiar language
usage to a total lack of expressive language function. These language oddities are manifest
in the form of phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic/behavioral
dysfunction. Research suggests that the autistic language deﬁcit is focal—dealing with a speciﬁc
area of language processing; however, previous research has failed to identify what that area of
processing might be. This thesis demonstrates a novel approach to the problem, showing that
the autistic language deﬁcit is tied to a particular aspect of language processing. This chapter
reviews major contributions to the study of autistic language and sets the framework for a new
approach to autistic language, which I present in Chapter 2.

1.1. PHONOLOGICAL AND SOUND PROCESSING. Autistic children exhibit marked peculiarities
with respect to sound processing and production. These children are remarkably sensitive to
acoustic stimuli (Sigman & Capps 1996:161-163). Additionally, they have great diﬃculty
developing speech; in fact, many autistic children are never able to acquire meaningful acoustic
production (Bosch 1970:123, 136). They have a particular problem with monotonic prosody
(Lamers & Hall 2003; Shriberg, et al. 2001; Ramberg, et al. 1996) and intonation (Happé
1995). For example, Shriberg, et al. (2001) demonstrate that autistic subjects have a diﬃcult
time using prosody to distinguish between the verbal and nominal forms of ‘present’ (pre’sent and ‘pre-sent, respectively). Prosody and intonation are also important to correctly
understanding grammatical information: many languages use prosodic contours to indicate
the focus of an utterance. For example, ‘John hit Joe’ can have three general interpretations
depending on which word is stressed (as indicated by a relatively large pitch change (∆P)
when the word is uttered). If the speaker emphasizes ‘John’ (agent focus), then she generally
does so on the presupposition that the hearer questions the identity of the agent of an action.
Likewise, event-focused and patient-focused prosody answer questions concerning the nature
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of the event and the identity of the patient, respectively. This is reﬂected in (1.1), where the
word in all caps is emphasized with a large and rapid rise and fall in pitch.

(1.1a) JOHN hit Joe (subject focus)
(1.1b) John HIT Joe (event focus)
(1.1c) John hit JOE (object focus)

Autistic phonology is also characterized by echolalia (Dobbinson, et al 2003; Prizant
1983; Prizant & Duchan 1981), which is ‘the mechanical and meaningless repetition of a
word or word group just spoken by another person’ (Fay & Schuler 1980). For example, when
a parent says ‘John is a good boy’, an autistic child might respond with ‘good boy’. This is
consistent with the behavior of autistic subjects at practically any age (Prizant 1983). In the
movie Rainman, Dustin Hoﬀman plays an autistic man (Ray) with remarkable abilities (a
savant), who repeats the Abbott and Costello routine ‘Who’s on First?’, but is unable to grasp
the humor, and has no particular reason for restating the routine.
Foxton, et al. (2003) test the weak central coherence theory of autism (inability to
unify the parts of stimulus into a single conception) by analyzing the auditory processing of
15 autistic and Asperger’s syndrome subjects against 15 control participants. Subjects were
administered auditory tests. In the ﬁrst, they were required to determine if two tones were
the same or diﬀerent based on the patterns of rising and falling pitch. For this task, same
patterns are totally identical and diﬀerent patterns occur when one of the notes is changes by
a magnitude of two.1
In the second, the subjects were given the same tone sequence as before, except that
it was transposed to a half-octave higher pitch (this test measured local pitch inference). In
other words, the notes are identical except there is a shift (up or down) by one-half octave for
the entire sequence. A diﬀerent sequence for this test pattern of rising and falling from note to
note is diﬀerent than the standard pattern.
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The third test combined local pitch inference with timing inference. For this test,
each tone sequence was followed by either a falling or rising pitch contour (which may or may
not be the same contour as the initial tone sequence), and the subjects were again asked to
discriminate diﬀerent pitches. The sequences and contour patterns are identical, but the exact
points of rising and falling diﬀer. ‘For example, the pitch directions in the ﬁrst sequence might
follow the series “up-down-down-down”, while for the second sequence the pitch directions
might follow the series “up-up-up-down”.
So both sequences rise and then fall in pitch, although the relative time points of these
changes do not match.’ Diﬀerent sequences, however, have diﬀerent contour conﬁgurations.
For example, one contour would rise, then fall in pitch, but a diﬀerent sequence would fall,
then rise in pitch.
The results showed that subjects with autism were actually better at discriminating
pitch changes in the task testing local pitch inference and timing inference. Foxton, et al.
(2003) attribute this diﬀerence to the tendency for a control subject to combine local auditory
details, which indicates the ability to draw global inferences from local information. The
marked diﬀerences in the study groups points out autistic subjects’ inability to make such
global inferences.
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Figure 1.1. The set distinction between normal and weak central coherence.

Figure 1.1 shows the distinction between normal and weak central coherence with
respect to pitch contours—autistic subjects don’t group stimuli into sets; normal people do.
Shriberg, et al. (2001) examined the diﬀerences in speech and prosody between normal
subjects and 15 male subjects with high-functioning autism (HFA) and 15 male subjects with
Asperger syndrome (AS). These were compared with 53 age-matched subjects with normal
speech development (according to the Normal Speech Acquisition on the Speech Disorders
Classiﬁcation System). The researchers compared speech and prosody between the three
groups. AS subjects are similar to HFA individuals except that people with AS do not have the
communicative abnormalities and language delay that are characteristic of HFA.
They found few statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the HFA and AS groups,
but the AS subjects showed a signiﬁcantly higher tendency to use ‘obsessive, repetitive topic
expression.’ For example, an AS subject might, if speaking about chocolate, utter a sentence
similar to ‘chocolate, chocolate, chocolate is sweet’.
In prosody, the HFA and AS groups showed a higher tendency, versus controls, for
speech-sound distortions, phrasing, faulty use of stress, loudness (too high), and high pitch (too
high). Speech-sound distortions occur when a subject mispronounces words. For example,
4

if a subject were trying to say dock (/dak/), but distorted the word-ﬁnal /k/ with voicing, then
the subject might be misunderstood as saying dog (/dag/), which might only be discernable by
context (if comprehensible at all).
Phrasing refers to HFA and AS subject sound/syllable/word repetitions, such as when
a subject utters ‘chocolate is IS sweet’. Unlike topic repetition, faulty phrasing deals with the
meaningless repetition of a non-topic word. Shriberg, et al. (2001) note that phrasing errors
did not correlate with higher speaking rate or high stress in the HFA and AS subjects.
Autistic and Asperger syndrome subjects also tend to apply stress incorrectly to a word.
For example, stress is vital to disambiguating the part of speech for many English words, such
as ‘present’—the nominal form bears syllable-initial stress (‘pre •sent), while the verbal form is
stressed on the ﬁnal syllable (•pre ‘sent).
Shriberg, et al. do not attempt to explain why these phenomena occur more frequently
in autistic/Asperger subjects than control subjects, but there are three possible explanations:
either as (1) purely articulatory/motor errors, (2) purely perceptual/sensory errors, or (3) some
combination of articulatory/perceptual mistakes. Options (1) and (3) cannot be discarded
with present data (investigations into these questions might be very insightful), but in Chapter
2, I argue that evidence strongly supports (2).

1.1.1. PERCEPTUAL/SENSORY DEFICIT DEFINED.

Before I begin describing the autistic

language deﬁcit, I need to deﬁne an important term: quantiﬁcation. It will be shown that
quantiﬁcation processes lie at the heart of autistic dysfunction. Quantiﬁcation deals with setsubset relationships. In traditional logic the basic quantiﬁers are ALL, SOME, and NOT. If
I say that ALL crows are black. I am saying that the whole set of crows is black. If I say SOME
crows are black. I am saying that only some subset of crows is black and some other subset is
NOT black (see Figure 1.2).

5

Figure 1.2. The set distinction between wide (left) and narrow (right) scope.

The key to understanding autism is to understand that set/subset distinctions made by
normal language users are NOT made by autistic subjects. Returning to the pitch-change data,
recall that autistic subjects did better at discriminating individual pitch changes, because they
were not grouping similar contour patterns into perceptual sets; they did not “overgeneralize”
the data, but rather they took each stimulus on its own terms. However, normal language
function utterly depends on such generalizations: the ability to generalize and then subsequently
diﬀerentiate (i.e. “quantify”) general sets into subsets.
A similar explanation is available for the stress-error data: normally the nominal form
bears syllable-initial stress (‘pre •sent), while the verbal form is stressed on the ﬁnal syllable (•pre
‘sent). The nominal and verbal forms are related semantically, but the noun indicates result (a
present was presented) while the verb represents a process. Result and process are subsets of a
larger set, again unavailable for processing to the autistic subjects.

1.2. MORPHOLOGICAL PROCESSING. Autistic children tend to have peculiar diﬃculty with
properly using morphemes and auxiliaries (Sigman & Capps 1996:75) such as tense markers
(Bartolucci 1972). For example, in data obtained from Dr. Tager-Fluberg (available through
6

the CHILDES database), an autistic subject uttered the sentence ‘Policeman open the door’
without indicating the temporal context of the event.

(1.2a) Policeman open the door.
[+NO TENSE]
(1.2b) Policeman open-ed the door. [+PAST TENSE]
(1.2c) Policeman open-s the door. [+PRESENT TENSE]

Example (1.2) demonstrates the actual autistic utterance, (1.2a), and two unrealized
alternatives, (1.2b) and (1.2c). This type of untensed verb construction is typical of autistic
language (Sigman & Capps 1996:75-76; Bosch 1970:121).
The relationship between tense and the matrix verb in these constructions is also an
issue of quantiﬁcation. Consider the sentence: Mike will ﬁnish hisithesis. This sentence implies
a global event set: MIKE TO FINISH HIS THESIS, and his global set can be decomposed
into separate subset events.

CAUSE:

Mike starts his thesis

PROCESS:

Mike writes his thesis

RESULT:

Mike ﬁnishes his thesis

Future tense provides information only about the truth-value of the result subevent. In
this way, tense decomposes a verbal event into its subsets (subevents) and provides information
about the truth value of one or more of these subevents; thus, tense is a type of quantiﬁcation,
as it provides more information about a subset (or subsets) of the event.
As a further example of morphological disorder, autistic people also tend to confuse
case marking on pronouns. For example, they might mistakenly substitute my for I or mine
(Churchill 1978:85; Bosch 1970:122).
Bartolucci, et al. (1980) compared acquisition of grammatical morphemes in autistic,
mentally retarded, and normal children. Both autistic and mentally retarded subjects were
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slow in morphological acquisition compared with normal controls; and, furthermore, there
were diﬀerences in acquisition between the autistic and mentally retarded groups—diﬀerences
which led them to conclude that, whereas the mentally retarded group was experiencing a
delay that corresponded to patterns in their global use of language, the autistic group was
experiencing diﬃculties indicative of a delay particular to grammatical morphology. These
conclusions were substantiated by Howlin (1984), who performed a study with a similar
methodology. I will likewise argue that the speciﬁc diﬃculty with case marking is a function
of a breakdown in quantiﬁcation processes.

1.3. SEMANTIC PROCESSING. Autistic children tend to perform similarly to normal children
with respect to basic agent-patient syntactic relationships; however, they perform at much
lower levels than normal children with respect to verbal negation (Shapiro & Kapit 1978). As
noted earlier, propositional negation is a basic form of logical quantiﬁcation. NO crows are
black means the subset of black crows is empty. Autistic subjects shy away from constructions
that negate a proposition, such as, ‘Jenny will not go’, where the proposition ‘Jenny go’ is
negated.

(1.3)

¬/not(Jenny will go)

(1.3) illustrates a situation where the event (i.e. the verb ‘go’ and all of its arguments)
are negated, but Shapiro & Kapit (1978) imply that non-verbal negation is unaﬀected. So, for
instance, an autistic individual might utter a sentence like ‘Jenny is impolite’, as frequently as
a normal individual. This type of construction, as opposed to (1.3), does not negate a whole
verbal event/state; rather, it negates just a small part of the larger proposition, in this case, the
adjective ‘polite’.

(1.4)

¬/not(polite)
8

The diﬀerence between negating a whole proposition:
It is NOT the case that Jenny is polite
and negating an isolated piece of a proposition:
It is the case that Jenny is impolite
illustrates a process called quantiﬁer scope. Whole-proposition negation has wide scope,
while isolated-phrase negation has narrow scope. Quantiﬁer scope will also prove quite
important to my analysis.
Autistic subjects also struggle with deixis (Rees 1984). The deictic components of a
sentence refer to ‘terms whose contribution to propositional content depends on the context’
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000:333). Deictic expressions can refer to people (I, you),
times (now, then, soon), places (here, there, near, far), etc. For example, the deictic expression
‘now’ in ‘Jenny is now going to the store’ refers to the speciﬁc time element for the event ‘Jenny
is going to the store’. ‘Now’ points to the event in the context of the present time.
According to model-theoretic semantics, deictic (Gk. ‘display’, ‘show’) expressions
point to individuals, times, places, etc that are members of a set (see Figure 1.3). Accordingly,
‘she’ in ‘She is happy’ refers to the set of all people and speciﬁcally to a member of the subset
‘she’. The important point, though, is that the member referred to in the set is dynamic. In
other words, the pronoun ‘her’ in Susan ate her dinner has a diﬀerent referent than in Annie saw
her picture.
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Figure 1.3. Set-subset relationship for deictic pronouns.

Churchill (1978:61-73) also found that autistic children have an unusually diﬃcult
time correctly leveraging prepositional syntactic relationships; in fact, they generally tend to
shy away from the use of prepositions altogether.
The semantics of a sentence preposition is similar to negation in that the preposition’s
scope (quantiﬁcational strength) is also tied to whether it modiﬁes a verb or a noun. Verbmodifying prepositions have wide scope, whereas noun-modifying prepositions have narrow,
or “weak” scope. Example (1.6) shows contrasting sentences in which the preposition modiﬁes
a verb and a noun, respectively.

(1.6a)
(1.6b)
(1.6c)
(1.6d)

John left from the bus terminal.
John [VP left [PP from the bus terminal]]
John is a man from Nottingham.
John is [DP a man [PP from Nottingham]]
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Sometimes resolving prepositional syntactic relations must occur with the aid of
context, as in the sentence ‘I saw the man with a telescope’. Alternate parses of this sentence
are reﬂected in Figures 1.4 and 1.5.

Figure 1.4. Parse of ‘I saw the man with a telescope’ where ‘with’ has wide scope over the verb.

Figure 1.4 reﬂects the X-bar parse in which ‘with’ modiﬁes the verb ‘saw’ (instrumental
reading of ‘with’). This reading literally means that the telescope is the instrument that I use
to see the man. Another way of describing this situation is to say that ‘with’ quantiﬁes over the
matrix verb ‘saw’. In Chapter 2, we will see that syntactic scope relationships have important
consequences for semantic interpretations of argument structure, eﬀects which are central to
autistic language.
In contrast, Figure 1.5 shows a potential parse of ‘I saw the man with a telescope’ where
‘with’ modiﬁes the determiner phrase (DP) ‘the man’. This literally means that ‘the man’ is
either in close proximity to a telescope or owns a telescope.
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Figure 1.5. Parse of ‘I saw the man with a telescope’ where ‘with’ has narrow scope.

With the help of contextual information a hearer may prefer one reading (either the
parse in Figure 1.4 or Figure 1.5) over another. For example, if my friend says ‘Just a second
ago, I saw the man with a telescope’ and my friend is holding a telescope, then I will probably
prefer the instrumental reading of ‘with’. However, if my friend does not have a telescope and
there is not a telescope in the vicinity that my friend could use, then I will probably assume
that ‘the man’ was carrying a telescope, or owns a telescope.
Prepositional phrases (PPs) modifying events restrict the event to a certain location,
manner, etc, and therefore involve quantiﬁcation. Consider the sentence: ‘Mary went to the
store’. The PP ‘to the store’ picks out a particular instance when the event ‘Mary went’ is true
(i.e. a particular member of the set of possible events where ‘Mary went’). The PP thus restricts
the members of the predicate set participating in the proposition by quantifying over the verbal
event (see Figure 1.6).
12

Figure 1.6. Diagram reﬂecting prepositional quantiﬁcation.

The fact that autistic subjects have a diﬃcult time sorting out prepositional syntactic
relations thus reﬂects a decreased eﬃciency in comprehending prepositional quantiﬁcation or
in using contextual clues to resolve attachment ambiguities, or both.
Tager-Flusberg, et al. (1990) compare the language of 6 autistic children with 6 agematched Down’s children by comparing mean length of utterance (MLU) and IPSyn (index
of productive syntax) between the two groups. They found that autistic subjects show a
precipitous decline in MLU after approximately ten months of normal language development,
as indicated by Stuart (one of the autistic subjects in the study). During the ﬁrst six months of
the study, Stuart’s MLU increased from 1.17 to 2.15, but between the ninth and tenth months
of the study his MLU dropped sharply to 1.47. Such a decline is not characteristic of Down’s
syndrome children.
The paper also observes that over time as the average MLU for autistic subjects increases
they tend to use a more restricted set of syntactic structures. So, even as their language
developed, the autistic subjects were likely to continue to use simple transitive sentences such
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as ‘policeman open the door’, as opposed to its passive counterpart ‘the door was opened by
the policeman’, repeatedly using the active constructions. Put diﬀerently, ‘autistic children
tend to rigidly depend on a particular sentence structure even though they have the knowledge
to employ greater variety in their speech’ (Tager-Flusberg, et al. 1990). Down’s syndrome
subjects do not demonstrate such inﬂexibility.
Tager-Flusberg, et al. found two other signiﬁcant grammatical diﬀerences between
autistic and Down’s children: (1) during early language development, autistic children use
speciﬁc nouns more frequently than closed class words (like auxiliary verbs, conjunctions,
determiners, prepositions, and pronouns)—the opposite is true for Down’s children. For
example, an autistic subject was more likely to utter a sentence like ‘dog eats cake’ than a
sentence with closed class words such as ‘the dog should eat cake and ice cream.
(2) Autistic children are less likely to use pronominal forms than Down’s children. So
an autistic child, referring to another person is more likely to use that person’s name (‘the dog
bit John’) or a description of the person (‘the dog bit the mailman’) rather than substitution
with a pronominal (deictic) term (‘the dog bit him’).
An important observation not made by Tager-Flusberg, et al. is that closed class words
often quantify over sets of events/states (e.g. auxiliaries), individuals (e.g. pronominals), sets
(e.g. determiners), locations (e.g. prepositions), or truth-values (e.g. negation, modals).
Nuyts and de Roeck (1997) studied the ability of high-functioning autistic individuals
to generate meta-representations based on their linguistic use of epistemic modality. They
measured modal adverbs, predicate adjectives, mental state predicates, and auxiliaries in autistic
versus control participants. Modal adverbs, such as ‘probably’ and ‘possibly’, often indicate the
likelihood of a verbal event/state, as in (1.7).

(1.7)

Rachel will probably go to the store.
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In (1.7), ‘probably’ provides additional information about the event ‘Rachel go to the
store’. As just mentioned, this modal adverb provides information about the probability of the
event ‘Rachel go to the store’ occurring.
Predicate adjectives (e.g. ‘possible’ and ‘probable’) are conceptually similar to modal
adverbs in that they also provide additional information about a state/event, as demonstrated
in (1.8).

(1.8)

It is probable that Rachel will go to the store.

The predicate adjective in (1.8) works in essentially the same way as the modal adverb
in (1.7)—indicating the probable truth-value of the event ‘Rachel go to the store’. Mental
state predicates are verbs such as ‘believe’ and ‘think’, that hold scope over a verbal event/state,
as indicated in (1.9).

(1.9a) I think that Rachel will go to the store.
(1.9b) I think [CP that [IP Rachel will go to the store]]

Notice that mental predicate verbs often subcategorize for a complementizer phrase
(CP), as in (1.9) where the CP (headed by ‘that’) c-commands the proposition ‘Rachel will go
to the store’.
Some auxiliaries also indicate epistemic modality. For example, ‘must’ governs a verbal
event/state and indicates the necessity of an event/state occurring, as demonstrated in (1.10).

(1.10) Rachel must go to the store.
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This example demonstrates that ‘must’ provides information about the unrealized
truth-value of the proposition ‘Rachel go to the store’. In other words, ‘must’ indicates that the
event has not yet occurred, but that it will occur sometime in the future. In this way modals
restrict the verbal event by the probability that the event will occur (as in epistemic modality)
or by the amount of obligation that connects the referent (‘Rachel’) to the event (as in deontic
modality). For example, ‘must’ in (1.10) indicates Rachel’s obligation (deontic modality) to
perform the event ‘go to the store’, as reﬂected in Figure 1.7.

Figure 1.7. Modality as an instance of quantiﬁcation.

Nuyts and de Roeck (1997) found that only one of the four autistic subjects
tested showed decreased ability to represent epistemic modality compared to controls, and
subsequently concluded that epistemic modality is a poor theory to describe autistic cognitive
dysfunctions.

1.4. AUTISTIC SYNTAX. To this point, I have described quantiﬁcation mostly in terms of
semantics. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 indicate how quantiﬁcation relationships are also represented
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syntactically by c-command. A syntactic node1 c-commands another node2, if node1 is the
sister of a node which is parent to node2. Consider, for example, the sentence: ‘Johni likes
himselfi’.

Figure 1.8. Syntactic representation of ‘Johni likes himselfi’.

In Figure 1.8, ‘John’ c-commands ‘likes’ and ‘himself ’ because its sister node (I’)
is parent to ‘likes’ (V0) and ‘himself ’ (DP); likewise, present tense c-commands ‘likes’ and
‘himself ’. Syntactic c-command is a way of representing semantic quantiﬁcation; thus, a
category in a higher c-command relation to a verb quantiﬁes more forcefully over the verb and
its arguments.

1.5. AUTISTIC PRAGMATICS/BEHAVIOR. Pragmatic/behavioral dysfunction is easily the most
documented area of autistic language. Recent research has paid particular attention to the
autistic ‘theory of mind’ deﬁcit. Uta Frith’s 1993 article in Scientiﬁc American brought ‘theory
of mind’ to the public attention, and subsequent work such as Mindblindness (1995), by Simon
Baron-Cohen, has further fueled interest in the idea.
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By deﬁnition, ‘theory of mind’ is ‘the ability to attribute mental states to self and others,
and to predict and understand other people’s behavior on the basis of their mental states’ (Fine,
et al. 2001). Stated diﬀerently, ‘theory of mind’ is the ability to reﬂect on one’s own and/or
another’s beliefs and intentions. This process requires the drawing of presuppositions. The
PBS series Evolution, produced by WGBH Boston, portrays a classic experiment used to test
for ‘theory of mind’ abilities in children. A child subject is presented with two dolls, a marble,
a basket, and a box. Doll1 places the marble in the basket and covers it with a handkerchief;
doll1 then leaves. Next, doll2 enters, removes the marble from the basket and places it in the
box, and doll2 exits. The experimenter then asks the child subject where doll1 will look for the
marble when she returns. Autistic subjects and children who are younger than (approximately)
four years claim, falsely, that doll1 will look for the marble in the box, as they are unable to
separate their perception of the situation from the perception of doll1. A person with a ‘theory
of mind’ deﬁcit is unable to comprehend that her perception of a situation is relative to her
unique perspective.
A ‘theory of mind’ deﬁcit presupposes a mind-reading deﬁcit. According to BaronCohen, the ability to mind-read requires four stages of development—volition, perception,
shared attention, and representing epistemic states; and the ﬁnal stage—representing epistemic
states (of one’s own and others’) requires theory of mind (1995:31). Leslie (1994) suggests
that these epistemic representations (called ‘meta-representations’ or ‘M-representations’)
have the form ‘[Agent-Attitude-Proposition]’. Accordingly, the sentence ‘Joe believes that
Julie is telling the truth’, has the form ‘[Joe(AGENT)-believes(ATTITUDE)-Julie is telling the
truth(PROPOSITION)]’. According to my interpretation, this implies that in order to ‘believe’
something about someone else, one must abstract/quantify a belief-state—a presupposition—
over another’s actions. For example, if I told my friend that ‘K-Mart is having a sale on
Preparation H’, I would do so on the supposition that my friend needs Preparation H (Ibelieve-my friend needs Preparation H). This process of presupposition suggests a process of
abstraction to interpret another’s thought.
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‘Theory of mind’ requires quantiﬁcation, as my belief state(s) must quantify over
another’s mental state. Reconsider the doll example:

Figure 1.9. A set-subset diagram of ‘theory of mind’.

‘Theory of mind’ (ToM) requires me to represent two knowledge states: (1) my own
(i.e. to understand what I know about the situation) and (2) doll1’s knowledge of the situation
(i.e. doll1 put the marble in the basket and was not present when the marble was moved). It
also implies, at least in this case, propositional negation:

•
•
•

if doll’s knowledge = marble in basket,
and if my knowledge = marble in box,
then doll’s knowledge ≠ my knowledge

The fact that ToM requires negation is important, as it uniﬁes ToM with the autistic dysfunction
in linguistic negation. Leslie’s description is an important step forward in understanding the
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autistic deﬁcit. Later in this thesis I will show that combining Leslie’s formal representation of
the ‘theory of mind mechanism’ with model-theoretic semantics lends important insights into
the cognitive etiology of the autistic deﬁcit—linguistically and behaviorally.
In addition to ‘theory of mind’, there are currently two other mainstream theories
aimed at describing autistic behavior—executive dysfunction and weak central coherence.
According to Hughes, et al. (1994), executive function refers to ‘the mental operations
which enable an individual to disengage from the immediate context in order to guide behavior
by reference to mental models or future goals.’ Planning is an excellent example of an executive
function. So, if I’m playing golf, for instance, on a par 5 hole I need to plan out steps to getting
the ball from the tee into the hole. If I fail to plan, then the result could be disastrous, as my
ball might end up in a sand trap or water hazard (which usually occurs anyway). Executive
dysfunction attempts to describe an autistic individual’s inability to plan ﬂexibly, suppress
incorrect responses, and retain relevant information in working memory. Poor performance
on the ‘Tower of Hanoi’ puzzle is a good reﬂection of executive dysfunction, and indeed,
autistic individuals perform poorly on this task (Hughes, et al. 1999).
Just like ToM, normal executive function requires quantiﬁcation. Consider the golf
example: planning is a goal-directed behavior (e.g. goal = ball in hole) that necessitates the
positing of subgoals to successfully accomplish the task at hand. In other words, the overall
goal of getting the ball into the hole can be quantiﬁed or subdivided into distinct subsets: (1)
draw the ball around the trees on the left to place the ball for an easy approach shot; (2) land
the ball just short of the green so it can trickle up and stop below the hole; and (3) it looks like
this putt will move from right to left, so I need to take that into account when calculating the
speed and direction of the putt; and so forth.
Executive-type dysfunction is not unique to autism, but is characteristic of individuals
with schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, ADHD, and other disorders. Research has
implicated damage to/abnormal development of prefrontal cortical areas that lead to executive
dysfunction and perseverative behaviors (Goldberg, et al. 1987; Guzelier, et al. 1988).
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The ‘weak central coherence’ approach to autism, on the other hand, states that autistic
individuals are unable to represent high-level meaning—indirect references that require the
hearer to ‘get the gist’ of what the speaker is trying to say/infer (Frith 1989). For example, if
someone said ‘there sure is a breeze in this room’, an autistic person might not understand that
the speaker wants someone to close the door.

1.6. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON AUTISTIC LANGUAGE. Figure 1.10 summarizes the
language and behavioral abnormalities in autism.

Phonology

Morphology

Syntax

Discourse/
Pragmatics

Echolalia
Monotonic Prosody
Pronominal Case Marking
Tense Marking
Negation
Tense
Modals
Prepositional Syntactic Relations
‘Theory of Mind’ Deﬁcit
Executive Dysfunction
Weak Central Coherence

Figure 1.10. A summary of previous work on autistic language dysfunction.

It is important to note that these ﬁndings are preliminary in that many of the
observations made in the literature are almost anecdotal, which suggests that more quantitative
studies need to be done to compile a justiﬁed list of dysfunctions. Even so, I will make the best
use I can of the available data, and, indeed, there is a striking generalization that emerges from
Figure 1.10, a generalization that I address throughout the remainder of this thesis.
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1.7. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS. Past research on autistic language has been highly descriptive
in nature and, for some reason, researchers in this area have failed to make fundamental
observations about the data that would begin to explain what these language problems share in
common with autistic behavioral abnormalities. This thesis, however, will attempt a correlation
and a demonstration that these linguistic and behavioral data are consequences of a single
deﬁcit in autistic cognition—that of quantiﬁcation.
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CHAPTER 2: INTERPRETATION OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

My approach to the autistic language problem presumes that language, like other cognitive
functions, is goal-directed to convey meaning (semantics); in other words, it assumes that
phonological, morphological, and syntactic representations generate semantic interpretations.
How the levels interface is a subject of debate in the linguistic community, and is happily
irrelevant to this treatment of autistic language. For the sake of consistency, I use X-bar
syntactic representations and model-theoretic semantic representations, as they are the ‘party
line’ theories in linguistics today, but other theories (such as HPSG, CG, LFG, etc) could also
be used to demonstrate the quantiﬁcation hypothesis.
Here is an example that illustrates how semantic representations are interpreted from
syntactic structure.

Figure 2.1. Mapping between syntax and semantics.
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Figure 2.1 reﬂects the mapping from syntactic to semantic structure. The semantic structure
at the right is a predicate calculus (PC) representation, which gives a general representation of
the semantics for the string ‘the author must ﬁnish the novel’. The PC representation shows
that the modal ‘must’ and the verb ‘ﬁnish’ map to hierarchical predicate positions in the PC,
while the determiner phrases ‘the author’ and ‘the novel’ map to arguments of those predicates
(external and internal, respectively).

2.1. ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC. The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) is, perhaps, the
most renowned thinker in history, and his writings on logic were considered the deﬁnitive
work until the early nineteenth century. In his Organon (Gk. ‘instrument’), Aristotle outlines
the rules of logic. He also draws a distinction between two types of logic: dialectic and analytic.
Dialectic, Aristotle argues, examines beliefs for their logical validity. Analytic, on the other
hand, infers using experience and observation (Bodéüs 1999:60-62).2 Put diﬀerently, dialectic
is induction, while analytic is deduction. Deduction allows us to draw speciﬁc conclusions
from generalizations, whereas induction extracts possible (not conclusive) general inferences
from particular instances.
In the Organon, Aristotle also proposes a system of categorical logic, which regards
subject-predicate assertions as the primary expressions of truth. For example, the meaning
of ‘Rose threw the ball’ is inseparably tied to the relationship between the predicate ‘threw’
and the subjects ‘Rose’ and ‘ball’. In this system, features or properties are shown to inhere
in individual substances, so the predicate ‘threw’ inherently subcategorizes for an external
argument ‘Rose’ and an internal argument ‘ball’. In every discipline of human knowledge,
then, we seek to establish that things of some sort have features of a certain kind. This work
laid the foundations of predicate logic—notions which were later expanded by Leibniz, Peirce,
Frege, Russell, and other important language philosophers.
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2.2. THE PREDICATE CALCULUS. Aristotle’s syllogistic logic was problematic, however, as it was
represented using regular language, and thus was subject to the ambiguities associated with
natural language. Additionally, it was unable to represent complex predicates. Gottfried W.
Leibniz was the ﬁrst to suggest a formalism for language similar to the mathematical formalism.
Leibniz’s predicate calculus made two major innovations over syllogistic logic. First, a notation
of connectives/conjunctions was developed (and, or, if, etc.), which made it possible to relate
and evaluate the truth-value of two or more interacting syllogisms as a single proposition.
Secondly, the predicate calculus introduced quantiﬁer-variable notation. Thus the sentence ‘x
is mortal’ predicates a quality (mortal) of x in the same way that ‘Socrates is mortal’ predicates
a quality of Socrates.
The predicate calculus representation consists, basically, of arguments (subjects, and
predicates) and relationships between those arguments. With this new formalism the sentence,
‘The children threw the ball’, is represented as two subjects (‘children’ and ‘ball’) and one
predicate (‘threw’), as reﬂected in Figure 2.2b (the syntactic parse is reﬂected in Figure 2.2a).
Part (c) of Figure 2.2 reﬂects a discourse representation structure (DRS), which might be easier
for some readers to understand.

Figure 2.2. X-bar syntactic and ﬁrst-order PC representations of ‘the children threw the ball.’
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Figure 2.2a shows a trace (ti) in spec-VP which is coindexed with spec-IP (DPi). This
shows the concept of subject raising: ‘the children’ are part of the VP (the ﬁrst-order predicate)
but, as an external argument of the verb, it raises to the IP (the higher-order predicate).
In this example, the predicate ‘threw’ deﬁnes the relationship between both subjects,
and because it’s a transitive verb, it will take two arguments. This assignment of arguments by
verbs to referring expressions is the core of predicate calculus. Predicate logic subdivides into
two basic types, ﬁrst-order and higher-order predicate calculus. Basically, ﬁrst-order predicate
calculus can represent simple predicate-argument relationships (restricted to verbal arguments),
whereas higher-order predicate calculus was designed to articulate generalizations about
individuals and their properties. In other words, higher-order logic denotes quantiﬁcation
(scope) over verbs and verbal arguments.
Higher-order predication works by applying ﬁrst-order predicates as subjects of higherorder predicates, a concept reﬂected in the sentence ‘A runner must run’, which contains one
subject (‘runner’) and two predicates (‘must’ and ‘run’). Figure 2.3b shows the predicate
calculus representation for this sentence.

Figure 2.3. X-bar syntactic and second-order PC representations of ‘a runner must run.’
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Addition of the modal ‘must’ to the sentence forces the representation from ﬁrst-order
to higher-order predicate logic, as it makes the event ‘run’ (e) a subject of the modal ‘must’.
So, in this example there are two subjects—x and e—and a single predicate ‘must’. In this way,
higher-order predicate calculus ‘substitutes, for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to
one subject, a single conception’ (Peirce 1931-1958:2.643).
Several linguistic phenomena can quantify over predicates, including tense and aspect
markers (see Example 1.2), modals (see Figure 2.3), prepositions (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5), and
negation (see Example 1.7). Interestingly, these linguistic categories that quantify correspond
to the language dysfunctions characteristic of autism that I documented in Chapter 1.
Citing this strong correspondence between higher-order predication and the
language diﬃculties in autism, I propose a hypothesis (2.1) and further investigation of this
phenomenon.

(2.1)

The Quantiﬁcation Hypothesis: The autistic language condition is characterized by a
speciﬁc linguistic dysfunction/diﬃculty: quantiﬁcation.

If the Quantiﬁcation Hypothesis (QH) is true, then one would expect to ﬁnd that, in
contrast with subjects with a global language deﬁcit (such as in Down’s syndrome and other
types of mental retardation), autistic subjects perform with comparable deﬁcits on higher-order
predication but better than their mentally retarded counterparts on ﬁrst-order predication.
Studies in Chapter 3 will test QH accordingly.
Before I begin my reanalysis of past research, I should say a few words about the
qualities of quantiﬁcation. By deﬁnition, ‘quantiﬁcational expressions introduce the power to
express generalizations into language, that is, the power to move beyond talk about properties
of particular individuals to saying what quantity of the individuals in a given domain have
a given property’ (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000: 113-114). In language, the matrix
verb in a sentence quantiﬁes over its arguments because it provides information about their
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behavior. For example, in the sentence ‘John ate pizza,’ the matrix verb ‘ate’ is a predicate
that quantiﬁes over its external argument ‘John’ and its internal argument ‘pizza’. One way to
represent the predicate calculus for this sentence is shown in (2.2).

(2.2)

ate(John, pizza)

The parentheses denote the scope of the predicate’s quantiﬁcation, so in the case of
(2.2) the extent of predication by ‘ate’ is restricted to two arguments—‘John’ and ‘pizza’.
According to the informal deﬁnition of quantiﬁcation I introduced in Chapter 1 ‘ate’
gives more information concerning its arguments (‘John’ and ‘pizza’). This is demonstrated in
the ﬁgure below.

Figure 2.4. Set-theoretic drawing of ‘John ate pizza’.

Thus, according to the relationship reﬂected in Figure 2.4, ‘ate’ provide information
about the actions of ‘John’ and the fate of the ‘pizza’.

2.3. AUTISTIC PHONOLOGY AND QUANTIFICATION. In Chapter 1, I noted that autistic individuals
tend to use prosody that is contextually inappropriate. Autistic prosody is also characteristically
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ﬂat and choppy, which often makes the speech of autistic subjects diﬃcult to understand
(Lamers & Hall 2003; Shriberg, et al. 2001; Ramberg, et al. 1996). Most studies on autistic
prosody simply describe it according to the autistic subject’s degree of variance from the norm,
but this does not explain why these prosodic irregularities exist.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, prosody in English is often used to denote the focus/topic
of the sentence, as in ‘BOB bought beer’, where the rise of prosody on ‘Bob’ denotes the focus
of the sentence. According to syntactic accounts, focus marking involves a tense phrase (TP)
and longer syntactic movement by the focus subject (versus a non-focus subject), as illustrated
in Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5. Syntactic representation of a focused subject.

Notice that in Figure 2.5, the focus subject ‘Bob’ must move over an extra phrasal
boundary (AgrP) in order to properly represent focus. This introduces the notion that syntactic
movement may metaphorically describe some of the language problems inherent in autism.
Extra movement is necessary in focus constructions, as the focused item must abstract greater
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scope over the event, a process which allows the hearer to understand that the event is not the
central item (which it generally is), but that the subject (or object, etc) is now the focal entity
in the sentence. The fact that autistic subjects have well-documented diﬃculty representing
focus may, therefore, point to a decreased ability to quantify over verbal events/states.

2.4. AUTISTIC MORPHOLOGY AND QUANTIFICATION. In Chapter 1, I listed the ﬁndings of
previous research on autistic morphological dysfunction. That list is reproduced below.

•
•

Pronominal Case Marking
Tense Marking

So what do these morphological phenomena have in common? This is the vital question
which the literature leaves unanswered, and which this thesis is intended to address. I will
attend to each of these points separately.

2.4.1. TENSE. Tense is a diﬃcult linguistic phenomenon to categorize, as it can be approached
either morphologically or syntactically: morphologically, since, in many languages, tense is an
inﬂectional or derivational form of the verb (ex. ‘-s’ and ‘-ed’ in English) or a separate lexical
form (ex. ‘will’ in English); and syntactically, because tense (I0 in X-bar syntax) governs the
complement verb phrase.
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Figure 2.6. Representations of ‘the lawyers enticed the criminal into a confession’.

Regardless of how one categorizes tense, its function, independent of the language
involved, is to ‘locate events in time with respect to a ﬁxed temporal reference point and then
specify the relation of the event to that temporal center by some direction and some degree of
remoteness’ (Frawley 1992:340). For example, the future tense marker ‘will’ in ‘I will go to the
store’ marks the time frame of the event ‘I go to the store’. In this way, tense c-commands an
entire clause (a verb phrase and all of its arguments) and thus, tense must be represented using
higher-order predicate logic. Figure 2.7b demonstrates the predicate calculus representation
of ‘A linguist interpreted the sentence.’
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Figure 2.7. The X-bar and PC representations for ‘a linguist interpreted the sentence.’

Figure 2.7b shows that the past tense (‘P’) quantiﬁes over the entire event of opening
the can. The fact that autistic subjects have diﬃculty with tense suggests that they might
also have trouble with other semantic operators that quantify over verbs, and I will show
throughout this chapter that this is the case.
Dr. Helen Tager-Flusberg gave me data to analyze from a corpus of sentences produced
by autistic and Down’s subjects available from the CHILDES database3. These data revealed,
in conformity with previous research, that tense is often dropped or misused by autistic
subjects. An example comes from an autistic subject’s discourse with his mother, where the
subject is trying to say that ‘The policeman will open the door’ (an assumption I make from
the context of the utterance), but the actual sentence he utters is ‘Policeman open the door.’
At ﬁrst glance, it might seem that a single word diﬀerence is not terribly signiﬁcant, but the
complexity of a sentence is not necessarily proportional to its length (an assumption of mean
length of utterance (MLU) studies).

32

Figure 2.8. The X-bar and PC representations for ‘policeman open the door.’

The sentence in Figure 2.6 does not have a tense marker (which would normally be
positioned in I0), so subject raising by ‘policeman’ to spec IP is unnecessary; thus all of the ﬁrstorder predicates are contained under the VP shell and as such are participants in ﬁrst-order
quantiﬁcation.
The predicate calculus representations of these sentences reveals that the diﬀerence
between the sentences is the degree of quantiﬁcation—the sentence without tense requires only
ﬁrst-order predication, while adding the tense marker necessitates second-order predication, as
revealed in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9. The X-bar and PC representations for ‘the policeman will open the door.’

x, y
policeman(x)
door(y)
open(x, y)
x, y, e
policeman(x)
door(y)
e: open(x, y)
F(e); where F is the future tense
Figure 2.9b. Contrasting PC representations.

Figure 2.9b shows that the tense marker (‘will’) quantiﬁes over the event (‘e’), which
contains the verb and its arguments; and, because of this ability to predicate over another predicate
(namely the verb), the tense marker provides an example of higher-order predication.
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2.4.2. PRONOMINALS. Pronominals (e.g. I, we, they) are a manifestation of linguistic deixis,
because they point to individuals in the real world. Take, for example, the sentence ‘I like
sardines’. I is deictic because it points to the speaker of an expression (ﬁrst person). Similarly,
you refers to the hearer of an expression (second person), and he/she/it refers to an individual or
entity outside of the speech act (third person).
By deﬁnition, deixis deals with ‘terms whose contribution to propositional content
depends on the context in which they are used, and their meaning consists in specifying the
aspect of context that determines what contribution to content they will make’ (Chierchia
& McConnell-Ginet 2000:333). Deictic expressions, such as pronouns, ‘comprise the set of
contextual anchors for deictic reference to speech act participants’ (Frawley 1992:280). For
example, the pronoun ‘I’ is context dependent, as it changes depending on the context/index
(e.g. it refers to a diﬀerent person if Mike Manookin says ‘I’ than if Dave Matthews says ‘I’). ‘I’
is an anchor (Peirce called it the Ground) because it refers to a member of a set. Finally, ‘I’ refers
to the speaker in a speech act, and is thus the deictic referent (Peirce’s Logical Interpretant).
Figure 2.10b shows the predicate calculus representation of ‘I enjoy chocolate.’

35

Figure 2.10. The X-bar parse for ‘I enjoy chocolate.’

This example reﬂects the three properties of pronouns just discussed: z is the anchor,
Mike Manookin is the deictic referent, and context relates these two attributes by the operation
z = x.
Why, then, do autistic subjects often incorrectly mark pronouns for case? For example,
autistic subjects often mark pronominal subjects (e.g. ‘I sneeze’) with the genitive case (‘my (or
mine) sneeze’) or accusative case (‘me sneeze’). Case theory in the Government and Binding
framework states that nominative case marking (‘I’) on a subject is assigned by Tense (I0) to the
speciﬁer position of IP after moving from speciﬁer VP position as in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11. X-bar representation of ‘I sneezed’.

If no movement occurs, according to the theory, then the pronominal might not appear
in nominative case. Thus, if the pronominal remains in the speciﬁer position of VP, then it
cannot receive case from I0 and thus might be found in any case, as reﬂected in Figure 2.12.
This observation describes case phenomena in several languages, including Russian (Preslar
1998).
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Figure 2.12. X-bar representation of ‘my/mine/me sneezed’.

This observation is important, as syntactic movement to higher c-command positions
above the VP shell is a way of abstracting scope over verbal predicates. To understand the
signiﬁcance of this point I need to introduce a theoretical approach (Butt & Ramchand 2001)
to mapping events from syntax to semantics. According to this approach, an event can be
decomposed into a maximum of three subevents: a causing subevent, a caused process, and a
caused result state. These subevents are mapped from syntactic structure in the following way:
the causing subevent maps from spec-IP, the caused process maps from spec-VP, and the caused
result maps from a nominal complement of the V-bar, as demonstrated in Figure 2.13, which
is a partial reproduction of Butt & Ramchand (2001).
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Figure 2.13. Mapping syntactic structure to event semantics.

Butt & Ramchand (2001) note that a subject can be represented in more than one
of these positions as demonstrated in traces (argument chains) previously. Figure 2.13
demonstrates that there is a semantic distinction between subjects in spec-VP and spec-IP.
Movement of a subject from spec-VP to spec-IP essentially imposes more causal/volitional
power on the moved subject. Thus, subject movement that abstracts higher scope over the VP
shell is really a metaphor for increasing volition or causal potential.
Consider the sentence: ‘Bill gave Betty a strawberry’.
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Figure 2.14. Syntactic representation of ‘Bill gave Betty a strawberry’.

Figure 2.14 shows that ‘Bill’ is both the subject (causer) of the event (spec-IP or causing
projection) and subject of the process subevent (as in ‘[Bill’s giving Betty a strawberry] amused
us’). Also, ‘Betty’ is subject of the result subevent (‘Betty’ now has ‘a strawberry’).

2.5. AUTISTIC SYNTAX AND QUANTIFICATION. The literature depicts three major areas of
irregularity in autistic syntax: negation, modals, and prepositional syntactic relations. This
section addresses each of these three phenomena in terms of semantic mapping.

2.5.1. PROPOSITIONAL NEGATION.

The ability to negate a proposition is an important

characteristic of language. Propositional negation ‘preferentially aﬀects only that part of the
proposition whose factual status, assertability, and commitment could be in doubt’ (Frawley
1992:391). Thus, a vital aspect of negation is its relationship to quantiﬁcation. Negation
can quantify over arguments internal to the proposition, or over the entire proposition itself.

40

For example, the negative operator (¬) in, ‘I am irrational,’ is internal to the proposition (i.e.
sentence) since it quantiﬁes over ‘rational’.

(2.2)

ir-rational
¬(rational)

Internal negation only requires ﬁrst-order predication as the negative operator applies
itself as a predicate of the subject ‘rational,’ and not another predicate. To contrast, in ‘I don’t
know a crook,’ the negative operator holds scope over the entire proposition (i.e. over the verb
and all of its arguments), as manifest by Figure 2.15.

Figure 2.15. X-bar and PC representations of ‘I don’t know a crook.’

Just as with other types of modality, proper representation of negation requires higherorder predicate calculus.
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2.5.2. MODALS. Modals (such as must and should), like negatives, have the ability to quantify
over a predicate verb. For example, in the string ‘the author must ﬁnish the novel,’ ‘must’
quantiﬁes over (c-commands) the verb and all the verbal arguments, as reﬂected in Figure
2.16.

Figure 2.16. The X-bar and PC representations for ‘the author must ﬁnish the novel.’

In this syntactic representation, ‘must’ is in the I0 node—the same place normally
occupied by tense. This shows that modalities like ‘must’ c-command the verb phrase (VP)
which contains the verb ‘ﬁnish’ and its internal arguments. Furthermore, in X-bar theory,
I0 assigns nominative case to the NP ‘the author,’ which is the external argument of the verb
‘ﬁnish.’ The semantic representation in Figure 16b reﬂects this concept more clearly, as ‘must’
quantiﬁes over ‘ﬁnish’ and its arguments.
Modals quantify over events and states, and thus quantify over verbs (which predicate
events and states) and their arguments. For instance, must and necessarily quantify over possible
situations, whereas always and will quantify over times (Frawley 1992:385-386).
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Modals that denote necessity, such as ‘must’ and ‘shall’, do not occur in the autistic
corpus, in fact the only modal that occurs with any frequency is ‘can’; and when it does occur,
it usually materializes in the context of asking permission as in ‘Can I have the cardboard?’
This use may be a more stereotyped use of the modal, but regardless modals are infrequent in
the autistic corpus—a fact that supports previous research on autistic language.

2.5.3. PREPOSITIONAL SYNTACTIC RELATIONS. Syntactically, prepositional phrases generally have
two possibilities: they can modify the preceding noun phrase, or the preceding verb phrase. For
example, in ‘John threw the baseball with seams to the catcher’ the ﬁrst prepositional phrase
(‘with seams’) modiﬁes the noun phrase (‘the baseball’), while the second prepositional phrase
(‘to the catcher’) modiﬁes the verb phrase (‘threw’). Semantically, this means that a prepositional
phrase can predicate over entities, events, or states; entities involve noun phrases while events and
states involve verb phrases. Predication is involved in each instance—prepositions predicating
over entities use ﬁrst-order predication, whereas prepositions predicating over events and states
involves higher-order predication. This fact is reﬂected in the syntactic and predicate calculus
representations of ‘the linguist reads novels with those glasses’ (Figure 2.17).
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Figure 2.17. X-bar and PC representations of ‘the linguist reads novels with those glasses.’

Notice that in this syntactic representation, the prepositional phrase ‘with those glasses’
attaches as an argument of the verb ‘reads’. This means that the prepositional phrase modiﬁes
(provides information outside the scope of ) the verb, and semantically, this is represented by
the preposition ‘with’ predicating (quantifying) over the event of ‘the linguist reads novels’.
Because the preposition ‘with’ predicates over an event, in this case, this is an example
of higher-order predication. To contrast, when a preposition predicates over an entity (ex. the
linguist enjoys novels with illustrations), ﬁrst-order predicate calculus is all that is required, as
reﬂected in Figure 2.18.
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Figure 2.18. X-bar and PC representations of ‘the linguist enjoys novels with illustrations.’

According to this model, an autistic person should have more trouble understanding
the semantic relation between prepositions predicating an event or state than s/he would with
a preposition predicating an entity.
In the autistic corpus I analyzed, a typical use of the preposition ‘with’ involved nominal
scope: ‘Give me a sentence with boomergang’. ‘With’ also occurs in sentences with verbal
predication such as ‘Go with Phil,’ but again, as with modals, prepositions in general were fairly
infrequent in the autistic corpus. More work needs to be done to determine which speciﬁc
types of prepositions autistic subjects struggle with, but this will require a fairly substantial
corpus.
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2.6. REFINEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS.

This gives me an opportunity to reﬁne my initial

hypothesis. From the above analysis, it is clear that autistic language is not deﬁcient in all
aspects of quantiﬁcation. Verbal predication, by all accounts, remains intact. I could extend
the hypothesis to include only higher-order predicate calculus operations, but this would not
account for misuse of pronouns. The quality that these phenomena share is that semantically
they all point out a set or member of a set. Quantiﬁers like ‘might’ point out a possible world
or circumstance for an event. Likewise, tense and aspect point out the time and status of an
event, respectively.

(2.5)

The Quantiﬁcation Hypothesis: The autistic language condition is characterized
by a speciﬁc linguistic dysfunction: operations that involve quantifying over a
verbal event or state, or processes that involve movement from lower to higher
subject positions.

This deﬁnition is an improvement over the previous version, as it more accurately
generalizes the observed phenomena. Visualizing the issue in this way also makes pragmatic
and behavioral trends more transparent.

2.7. AUTISTIC PRAGMATICS/BEHAVIOR AND QUANTIFICATION. The vast majority of autistic
language research centers on the area of pragmatics. This ﬁeld of linguistics studies meaning in
context, and for this reason is closely related to behavior and semantics.
There are three main pragmatic/behavioral theories of autism: (1) theory of mind, (2)
executive dysfunction, and (3) weak central coherence. Many researchers in the ﬁeld view
these theories in competition, but this section shows that all three theories share a common,
unifying quality—they all describe autism in terms of a deﬁcit in quantiﬁcation, although,
to my knowledge, no one has described the theories in these terms. This section illustrates
that the quantiﬁcational deﬁcit hypothesis of autism, as outlined in this thesis, is a unifying
generalization describing a common characteristic of autism that holds from the most basic
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area of language perception, through increasingly complex language structures, to the most
complex behavioral interactions.

2.7.1. THEORY OF MIND. ‘Theory of mind’ is probably the best known theory of autism, and
it describes the ability to understand that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are
diﬀerent from one’s own. This is a capacity that normally develops between the ages of 3 and
5, but which is missing from autistic subjects at any age.
Baron-Cohen (1995) suggests that the mind-reading vital to the theory of mind
capacity has a structure—‘Agent-Attitude-Proposition4.’ This means that in order to guess at
someone’s intentions, one must be able to abstract a propositional state from another’s actions.
So, if I believe that John is upset, it is only because I have abstracted from John’s various actions
(facial expressions, tone of voice, etc.) that John might be upset about something. This is a
quantiﬁcational inference, as I am supposing that John’s frowning and his abrupt tone are
qualities of the same state. Perhaps the connection will be clearer if we study this phenomenon
in the context of set theory.
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Figure 2.19. A set-theoretic representation of ‘theory of mind’ inference.

Thus, the mental state of ‘being upset’ quantiﬁes over the set of its qualities (e.g.
frowning, abrupt tone, etc.). Furthermore, in order to believe something about John’s mental
state, my state of belief must quantify over John’s supposed mental state. For example, ‘believe’
quantiﬁes over the supposed mental state of John in the sentence ‘I believe that John wants a
drink,’ as the predicate calculus representation in Figure 2.20 illustrates.
x, y, s
I(x)
John(y)
drink(y)
s: wants(x, y)
believe(x, ^s)
Figure 2.20. PC representation for ‘I believe that John wants a drink.’
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In this representation ‘I’ is the external argument of ‘believe,’ which quantiﬁes over the
event ‘John wants a drink’ (s), which is John’s supposed mental state.
This same concept (quantiﬁcation) also applies to other aspects of theory of mind such
as counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning is a type of hypothetical reasoning in
which at least one state of aﬀairs (proposition) is deemed false. ‘Counterfactual reasoning .
. . involves the very sort of monitoring of psychological states for which a theory of mind is
needed—the ability to keep track of the scope of a supposition, to diﬀerentiate one’s actual
beliefs from the counterfactual supposition, and to make appropriate modiﬁcations in some of
one’s background beliefs’ (Botterill & Carruthers 1999:102).
I ﬁnd it interesting that Botterill & Carruthers use the phrase ‘keep track of the scope of
a supposition’ to describe the vital process required for successful counterfactual reasoning—a
type of hypothetical reasoning5 (Halpern 1999) which requires the ability to represent and
recognize true and false circumstances (models of the world), and reasoning on the basis of the
incorrect model (Roese 1997). Thus, counterfactual reasoning negates a proposition,6 then
uses this new proposition and implications that follow from it to understand and deal with a
situation.

2.7.2. EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION. Executive function describes ‘the mental operations which
enable an individual to disengage from the immediate context in order to guide behavior by
reference to mental models or future goals’ (Hughes, et al. 1994).
Autistic subjects show executive dysfunction as evidenced by poor scores on the
Wisconsin Card Sort (Ozonoﬀ, et al. 1991; Reichler & Lee 1987; Rumsey & Hamburger
1990; Sandson & Albert 1984), Tower of Hanoi (Ozonoﬀ, et al. 1991), and Tower of London
(Hughes, et al. 1994) tasks. I will describe each test brieﬂy. This section will show that the
autistic condition is characterized, not by a general diﬃculty with planning, but by a speciﬁc
aspect of the planning task—the ability to abstract/quantify over a model.
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THE WISCONSIN CARD SORT TEST. The Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) is performed with a
pack of sixty cards, each of which has either a triangle, star, cross, or circle, in one of four colors
(red, green, yellow, or blue), and, in some versions of the test, one of four numbers (1, 2, 3,
or 4). Each card in the pack is unique. The examiner instructs the subject to put the cards,
one at a time, under four sample cards. The tester either approves or disapproves of each card
placement by the subject; the subject must use this information (approval or disapproval) to
infer the sorting rule. After the subject has determined the correct rule and correctly placed
ten consecutive cards, the rule is changed and the subject must reanalyze her/his approach.
The required rule sequence for the test is (1) color, (2) form, and ﬁnally (3) number. The
task is scored by the number of correct strategies inferred with the pack of cards (Saper, et al.
2000:358).
Autistic subjects show strong perseveration during the WCST (Ozonoﬀ, et al. 1991;
Reichler & Lee 1987; Rumsey & Hamburger 1990; Sandson & Albert 1984). In other words,
they keep putting a card on the wrong stack even when the researcher has already told them
that the previous placement (i.e. the previous rule they were using) was incorrect. To explain
why autistic subjects have trouble reanalyzing during this task, I will explore the subtasks/
subgoals required to successfully accomplish this task.
Let’s examine a hypothetical WCST scenario according to the reasoning process
involved. There are four cards face up on the table: a blue triangle, a red circle, a yellow star,
and a green cross. I must decide what to do with the ﬁrst card in the deck, a blue star. I have
two choices that correspond to the qualia of the card itself (blue & star)—I can place the blue
star under the blue triangle or the under yellow star.
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Figure 2.21 walks through the normal steps in the decision-making process for inferring
the correct rule for a given instance in the WCST. Card X refers to the card I have in my hand
(that I must place) and the test cards are the four cards under which I must place card X. Thus,
this is a categorization problem.

Each card in this deck has exactly two qualia.
The test cards and card X are from the same deck.
CASE1: Card X shares a quality with two of the test cards.
RESULT2: Card X has the qualia blue & star.
RULE2: If the vital quality is blue and I place card X under the blue triangle, then the
examiner will approve of this choice.
CASE2: When I placed card X under the blue triangle, there was conﬁrmation.
RESULT3: The vital quality is ‘blue.’
RULE1:

RESULT1:

Figure 2.21. Normal steps in inferring a WCST rule.
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This ﬁrst step was a quantiﬁcation, as I abstracted from the card’s qualia (the sets to
which it belongs) the possible cards which might govern the set to which the card in my hand
belongs.

Next, I must set out an if-then proposition (a deduction). If the decisive quality is
‘blue’ and I put the card under the blue triangle, then I expect the investigator to approve of
my choice, else the quality must be ‘star.’
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Finally, I must run a test to conﬁrm whether my supposed rule is or is not correct.
Perseveration in the wrong choice, which is typical of autism, would occur if the initial step
were a completely unguided guess. On reanalysis (when I should place the second card down)
I would not have determined the rule that governs this case. Thus, misguided perseveration is
indicative of behavior that is not goal-directed in nature, which cannot abstract goal-directed
guesses from the immediate context.

THE TOWER OF HANOI. To administer the Tower of Hanoi task, a researcher gives the subject
three pegs (A, B, and C). Three rings—one large, one medium, and one small (respectively,
top to bottom)—surround peg A; pegs B and C are empty. The object of the task is to move
the discs to peg C so that they arrive in the same order, but only one disc may be moved at a
time, and a larger disc cannot be placed on a smaller one.
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CONDITION1:

rings must be bottom to top, smallest to largest, respectively
CONDITION2: cannot move a larger disc cannot be placed on smaller
CONDITION3: Cf = Ai
(in the initial state) has the same qualia as Cf (in the ﬁnal state).
RESULT1: Ai ≠ Af; Bi = Bf; Ci ≠ Cf; nothing is known about intermediate states.
CASE1: Pegs A & C must change state; don’t know about B.
RESULT2: Ring L can be moved to either B or C.
RULE2: If move to B, then C is empty; if move to C, then B is empty.
CASE2: When L is on B, condition1 is optimal with respect to C.
RESULT3: Moving L to B is the optimal move.
RULE1: Ai

Figure 2.22. Subgoal1: move a ring to uncover a smaller ring.

To solve the Tower of Hanoi problem, one must ﬁrst decide how to move the largest
ring (L). Figure 2.22 reﬂects this process. In order to solve subgoal1 I must ﬁrst make a general
guess as to what must happen, by abstracting information about this case (subgoal1) from the
general qualia of the task; thus, rule1, result1, and case1 are all steps in the quantiﬁcational
reasoning which begins this process.

CONDITION1:

rings must be bottom to top, smallest to largest, respectively
CONDITION2: a larger disc cannot be placed on smaller
CONDITION3: Cf = Ai
(in the initial state) has the same qualia as Cf (in the ﬁnal state).
≠ Af; Bi = Bf; Ci ≠ Cf; nothing is known about intermediate states.
CASE1: Pegs A & C must change state; don’t know about B.
RESULT2: Ring M can be moved to either B or C.
RULE2: If move to B, then C is empty; if move to C, then large is on B & medium is on
C.
CASE2: When M is on B, condition1 is optimal with respect to C.
RESULT3: Moving M to B is the optimal move.
RULE1: Ai

RESULT1: Ai

Figure 2.23. Subgoal2: move another ring to uncover a smaller ring.
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After subgoal2 completes, the ﬁnal subgoal (subgoal3) begins and ultimately results in
successful completion of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle.

CONDITION1:

rings must be bottom to top, smallest to largest, respectively
CONDITION2: cannot move a larger disc cannot be placed on smaller
CONDITION3: Cf = Ai
(in the initial state) has the same qualia as Cf (in the ﬁnal state).
RESULT1: Ai ≠ Af; Bi = Bf; Ci ≠ Cf; nothing is known about intermediate states.
CASE1: Pegs A & C must change state; don’t know about B.
RESULT2: Ring S can be moved to either B or C.
RULE2: If move to B, then C is empty; if move to C, then L&M on B and S on C.
CASE2: When S is on C, condition3 is optimal.
RESULT3: Moving S to C is the optimal move.
RULE1: Ai

Figure 2.24. Subgoal3: move the smallest ring (S) optimally.

Figures 2.22-2.24 reﬂect normal decision processes (or mental states and transitions)
necessary to solve this puzzle. These ﬁgures are the starting point in understanding why
autistic individuals have diﬃculty with this problem. The mere fact that autistic subjects have
trouble solving the Tower of Hanoi puzzle suggests that they are not processing the problem
in the same way as a normal person (i.e. they are not traversing the same states as a normal
individual). What are they missing?
This process must begin with some doubt or uncertainty. If I am to solve this task, then
I must begin with a question: how can I get from my present state (state1) to the desired (goal)
state (state2)? This question, in turn, leads to another inquiry: what is the process to get from
state1 to state2; what are the transitions? This second question leads me to propose subgoals,
which set the process in motion. But in addition to being the beginning of the process, this
second question is an example of quantiﬁcation, as it requires me to posit a sequence and form
for each subgoal (i.e. to treat the subgoal as a set and to subdivide this set into subsets).
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Figure 2.25. Representation of the sub-processes involved in executive function.

Figure 2.25 shows that the executive function has at least two layers of quantiﬁcation:
(1) a layer that separates the goal (e.g. solve the Tower of Hanoi) into distinct subgoals and (2)
a layer that splits each subgoal into the process of hypothesis, testing, and reanalysis.
Without this ability to quantify, the process would not be goal-directed, which is what
seems to be the case in autism. This explains the signiﬁcant diﬃculty that autistic subjects
have (versus normal subjects) with planning tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi and Tower of
London puzzles.

THE TOWER OF LONDON. Hughes, et al. (1994) found that autistic subjects perform poorly on
the Tower of London task. This task, like the Tower of Hanoi, relies on three rings and three
pegs, but instead of hearing the goal (as in the Tower of Hanoi), in the Tower of London task
the subject is shown the initial and goal states of the rings and pegs (Saper, et al. 2000). The
fact that autistic subjects have trouble on both ‘Tower’ tasks illustrates that their executive
dysfunction is not speciﬁc to either visual or auditory processing, but is a general deﬁcit.
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Unfortunately, no study has looked at the speciﬁc points in this task where the
reasoning of the autistic subjects begins to break down. This question is vital to evaluating
my hypothesis—that the quantiﬁcational aspect of these tasks is at fault for the more general
failures.

2.7.3. WEAK CENTRAL COHERENCE. The weak central coherence theory of autism was proposed
because of theory of mind’s inability to explain the exceptionally good performance of autistic
subjects on certain visual and spatial tasks, such as block design and object assembly (Happé
1994; Shah & Frith 1993). Frith and Happé (1994) suggest that these discrepancies in the
theory of mind are products of weak central coherence, which is deﬁned as ‘the normal tendency
to integrate local information in the search for global meaning, a tendency to focus on the
whole rather than the parts of any stimulus’ (Jarrold, et al. 2000). For example, when given
a jigsaw puzzle, many autistic subjects are able to solve the puzzle quickly with the pictures
facing down (Rimland 1978). In other words, the autistic subjects use bottom-up processing
eﬃciently at the expense of top-down processing—they are not ‘seeing the big picture,’ so to
speak.
So what allows someone to see the big picture when faced with a problem? The answer
is quantiﬁcation. In fact, central coherence is one of the truly lucid examples of quantiﬁcation.
In terms of a jigsaw puzzle, the process is, as previously mentioned, seeing the puzzle pieces as
parts (qualia) of the entire puzzle, and since the puzzle is a picture, the pieces are individual
qualia of the overall picture.
When I attempt to solve a puzzle, my thought processes are something like this:
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Figure 2.26. Subgoaling involved in solving part of a puzzle.

As with other examples discussed previously, central coherence is initialized by positing
a hypothesis (in terms of the big picture, no pun intended), testing that hypothesis, and
reanalyzing if the hypothesis tests false (or applying the successful rule to further cases).
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS INVESTIGATION

Autistic language research must account for the fact that approximately 75 percent of autistic
individuals are also classiﬁed as mentally retarded (deﬁned as an IQ < 70) while only 3 percent
of the general population is so classiﬁed (Task Force on DSM-IV: 1994). Language research
comparing the language properties of autism and mental retardation can isolate the linguistic
abnormalities speciﬁc to autism.

3.1. A SYNTAX STUDY. At the end of Chapter 2, I posited my hypothesis: that the autistic
language dysfunction is speciﬁc to linguistic quantiﬁcation. In this chapter, I will test this
hypothesis by comparing autistic language data with language data from Down’s syndrome
subjects. This study will speciﬁcally address the syntactic structure of these groups by comparing
parts-of-speech (POS).
Examining POS can provide important information about syntactic relationships. For
example, if a complementizer occurs in the corpus, then we know that a CP structure exists in
the sentence. Also, if a modal POS occurs, then we know that an IP is in the sentence. These
examples are demonstrated below:
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Figure 3.1. Syntactic structures associated with a complementizer and modal, respectively .

Tager-Flusberg, et al. (1990) published a study comparing mean length of utterance
(MLU) between six autistic and six Down’s syndrome subjects. The subjects were matched
for age. Dr. Tager-Flusberg gave me permission to analyze her data for use in my thesis. The
data ﬁles are transcriptions of interactions that the subjects (autistic or Down’s) had with one
of their parents7.
I sought out data comparing autistic and mentally retarded (MR) subjects, because
previous research comparing autistic subjects has given considerable evidence for the
quantiﬁcation hypothesis (QH). So, if we have some idea of what distinguishes autistic subjects
and normal subjects, and approximately 75% of autistic subjects are technically mentally
retarded, then to discover what is uniquely characteristic of autism requires us to understand
the diﬀerence between autistic and MR subjects.
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3.1.1. METHOD. I performed an analysis of these data to determine whether part-of-speech
usage is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the autistic and Down’s subjects. Signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is deﬁned as a P value below 0.05 in an analysis of variance (ANOVA). To do this I extracted
each subject’s utterances from the data ﬁle and fed each sentence into a probabilistic part-ofspeech tagger (QTAG8), developed by Tuﬁs and Mason (1998). QTAG uses Hidden Markov
Models (HMMs) to probabilistically determine a word’s part-of-speech; therefore the POS of
a given word is not 100% certain. QTAG, however, is a widely used tagger, which provides
useful generalizations over a large data set. In other words, no part-of-speech tagger will
perform perfectly (nor will any human), but the generalizations are strong enough that an
analysis of variance will be unaﬀected by the minor mistakes that such a tagger might make.
I took the output from QTAG and ordered each subject’s parts-of-speech (13 total
classes) according to frequency of occurrence, then determined the fraction of each subject’s
words that consisted of a given part-of-speech. ANOVA was then performed on the data
and the results were tabulated. The null hypothesis (Ho) for this study is that the average
proportion of a given part-of-speech is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the autistic and
Down’s subjects. The alternative hypothesis (Ha), on the other hand, is that these proportions
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.

3.1.2. RESULTS. The results of this analysis are reﬂected in Table 3.1—P values are bolded. The
raw data are provided in Appendix A, at the end of this thesis.
POS
Df Sum of Sq
Mean Sq
Noun
1
0.0053728
0.00537284
Verb
1
0.0066413
0.00664129
Determiner
1
0.0007189
0.00071887
Complementizer 1
0.0022772
0.00227717
Adjective
1
1.707E-05
1.7069E-05
Preposition
1
7.496E-05
7.4956E-05
Adverb
1
4.431E-05
4.4308E-05
Quantiﬁer
1
7.412E-05
7.4116E-05
Modal
1
5.763E-05
5.763E-05
Inﬂection
1
3.883E-05
3.8826E-05
Negation
1
1.869E-06
1.87E-06
Table 3.1. Results from ANOVA for part-of-speech.
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F Value
0.6218047
6.156218
0.5197069
6.003701
0.5430374
0.3001649
2.0571
2.365665
1.175944
0.6268374
0.1876413

Pr(F)
0.4486674
0.03247753
0.4874776
0.03424342
0.4781092
0.5957957
0.1820208
0.1550491
0.3036348
0.4468911
0.6740815

These data show that signiﬁcant variance between the autistic and Down’s subjects
only occurs with respect to two categories—verbs and complementizers. Since the P values
for these categories are below 0.05, I reject the null hypothesis and conclude that these partsof-speech are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between autistic and Down’s subjects. In other words, the
autistic children used verbs far more frequently and complementizers far less frequently than
the Down’s children. I should note that nouns, adjectives, prepositions, and negation9 are
not informative concerning degree of quantiﬁcation. That is why I do not comment on them
hereafter.

3.1.3. ANALYSIS. Why, then, are verbs more common in autism than in Down’s syndrome,
whereas the reverse is true for complementizers? Semantically, the deﬁning aspect distinguishing
verbs and complementizers is the degree of quantiﬁcation involved.
Let me illustrate this distinction with a few contrastive examples from the corpus.
First, we’ll examine the diﬀerence in verb use between the autistic and Down’s children. The
sentence ‘I eat a Oreo cookie’ is an example of typical transitive verb use in the autistic corpus,
whereas the Down’s corpus used verbs less frequently; but when verbs do occur in the autistic
corpus, they have a similar structure to the autistic constructions. Consider the Down’s
sentence: ‘Horse gonna eat some hay’. Transitive verbs are good examples of basic ﬁrst-order
predication/quantiﬁcation.
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Figure 3.2. Syntactic representation of ‘I eat a Oreo cookie’.

In this example, everything c-commanded by the speciﬁer of the VP participates in
ﬁrst-order quantiﬁcation. There is a ‘?’ mark in I0, as it is unclear whether ‘eat’ is tensed (this
is also unclear from context in the corpus). This set diagram illustrates this point.

Figure 3.3. Set diagram of ‘I eat a Oreo cookie’.
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Here, the transitive verb ‘eat’ predicates two thematic relations: agent (‘I’) and patient
(‘a Oreo cookie’). This type of structure does not require partitioning of the set (={eat}) in any
way. Thus, the assumption of this study is that a signiﬁcantly lower frequency in verb use by
Down’s children points to a corresponding decrease in ﬁrst-order predication.
Complementizers, however, involve higher-order predication (quantiﬁcation).
Consider this sentence from the Down’s corpus: ‘We have to talk about our pictures when we
go skiing’. Here, the complementizer ‘when’ joins (and relates) two sentences.

Figure 3.4. Representation of ‘we have to talk about our pictures when we go skiing’.

64

The complementizer ‘when’ c-commands the lower VP and also creates a logical
dependency relationship where ‘we go skiing’ implies ‘we have to talk about our pictures’. This
set-subset relationship is reﬂected below:

Figure 3.5. Set-subset diagram of ‘we have to talk about our pictures when we go skiing’.

Thus, ‘we have to talk about our pictures’ gives us information about ‘we go skiing’
such that ‘go’ is no longer simply a two-place predicate that assigns two thematic roles (roles
received by ‘we’ and ‘skiing’). The autistic children used complementizers far less frequently
than the Down’s kids, and when complementizers do occur in the autistic corpus, they often
have a diﬀerent form. Consider this sentence taken from the autistic corpus: ‘I wonder when
I’ll have chocolate milk’. These conjoined sentences relate to each other in the following way:
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Figure 3.6. Set-subset diagram of ‘I wonder when I’ll have chocolate milk’.

This ﬁgure shows that there is no logical implication between the propositions ‘I wonder’
and ‘I’ll have chocolate milk’ (i.e. ‘I’ll have chocolate milk’ does not imply ‘I wonder’).
I should note, or rather reiterate, that the data presented in Chapter 1 show that autistic
subjects are impaired compared to normal controls in quantiﬁer, adverb, modal, inﬂection,
and negation use. This fact is probably not apparent from Table 3.1 because the Down’s
subjects also have trouble with these categories; these data do, however, illustrate the deﬁning
distinction between autistic and Down’s syntax: the degree of quantiﬁcation. Compared
to their autistic counterparts, Down’s subjects struggle with all levels of predication (ﬁrstorder and higher), whereas, semantically, the autistic language deﬁcit is speciﬁc to higher-order
predication (second-order and higher). Figure 3.7 compares the average frequency of ﬁrstorder (verbal) predication and higher-order (complementation, adverbial, quantiﬁcational,
modal, and inﬂectional) predication between the Down’s and autistic groups.
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Figure 3.7. Comparison of predication levels between Down’s and autistic subjects.

Figure 3.7 shows graphically the distinction illustrated in Table 3.1. First-order
predication is signiﬁcantly more functional in the autistic subjects, but higher-order predication
is, as a whole, comparable between the groups—a fact which further supports my hypothesis.
Furthermore, I predict that, given a larger data set, other diﬀerences will emerge. For
example, adverbs (P = 0.182) and quantiﬁers (P = 0.155) should more closely approximate a
‘P’ value of 0.05 as there will be a larger corpus to analyze. Modals, inﬂection, and determiners
should do the same.

3.1.4. CONCLUSION. These new ﬁndings not only support, but characterize, the observation that
‘there does not appear to be a global language deﬁcit in autism that aﬀects all aspects of language
functioning’ (Tager-Flusberg 1981:52). Indeed, the language dysfunction characteristic of
autism is not global, but rather speciﬁc to a particular type of language operation—higherorder predication or scope abstraction.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

The data in Chapter 3 introduce two questions: (1) how do these ﬁndings relate to the
observation that autistic language acquisition is slowed, and (2) what are the possible
neurobiological processes that are interrupted in autism? This chapter addresses these questions,
gives conclusions to the thesis, and provides direction to future research in this area.

4.1. AUTISTIC LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND THE QUANTIFICATION HYPOTHESIS. Autistic children
show a general slowing in their ability to acquire language (Prizant 1983). Prizant suggests
that language development ideally involves a transition from gestalt methods (i.e. parroting/
mimicking things that they hear) to analytic learning. In analytic acquisition children begin
to abstract generalizations about how language is used. For example, they start to realize
that the word ‘toy’ is not restricted to their experience with toys, but that ‘toy’ can denote
something outside of their experience (like ‘that big boat is my dad’s toy’). In other words,
during analytical language acquisition the child begins to realize that her/his representation of
the world may diﬀer from other world views. This process is analogy or hypothesis.
In normal children, gestalt acquisition peaks at about 30 months of age (Lovaas 1981),
as reﬂected in their prominent use of echolalia and pointing. Soon after 30 months, these
children begin to use more analytical/analogical methods, which results in an increasing
development of spontaneous language.
Autistic children, however, are often delayed in their transition to spontaneous speech,
and many never advance past echolalic language (if they ever progress to the use of echolalia).
Autistic children also show periodic declines during language acquisition as demonstrated by
drops in MLU (Tager-Flusberg, et al. 1990) and declines gestalt language use (Prizant 1983).
Why do these declines occur?
Gestalt methods (e.g. echolalia) also decline in normal children as the utility of ‘stereotyped’
language constructions/expressions decreases. This decline, however, is accompanied by a
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corresponding increase in analytical language (Prizant 1983). The quantiﬁcation hypothesis
(QH) predicts that declines may occur in autistic gestalt language, just as it does in normal
children, but there will not be a corresponding rise in analytical language; and, indeed, this is
observed (Prizant 1983).
The QH predicts that analytical language will be delayed or absent autistic subjects, as
this method of learning requires quantiﬁcation. Quantiﬁcation is vital to analytical learning
methods, which require a dynamic model of the world.

Figure 4.1. Diagram of analytical language learning.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates that as the child participates more in analytical learning, her/
his model of the world expands to encompass more of the possible models of a word, concept,
etc. Analytical learning is thus a form of quantiﬁcation, as it introduces new information (e.g.
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‘my toys are fun; my daddy thinks his boat is fun’) that brings about a reanalysis of the child’s
model. This same process is involved in understanding metaphor.
An autistic child’s model, since s/he is restricted to gestalt methods, is limited—s/he
will be unable to expand her/his model, caused by an inability to understand that other models
are possible, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2. Diagram of language learning restricted to gestalt methods.

Limiting the mind in this way (i.e. autistic models are not dynamic) results in a
decreased ability to reanalyze and limits language and behavior to stereotyped constructions/
static models.
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4.2. NEUROBIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE QH. Now that we have the beginnings of a
single, uniﬁed theory to describe the linguistic and behavioral characteristics of autism, the
next question to ask is whether there is neurobiological data that suggest a possible etiology (or
etiologies) for the autistic condition. This question is not easily answered, as psycholinguistics/
neurolinguistics has done little work to test the more complex linguistic theories (like predicate
calculus, quantiﬁcation, etc). As a result, practically nothing is known about how the mind/
brain deals with quantiﬁcation. What, then, can we learn about autism from the QH?
It is clear from language philosophers that quantiﬁcation is a function of ‘higher’
(perhaps the ‘highest’) cognition, and such processes are often associated with the frontal lobes.
Research, for example, has strongly implicated the frontal lobes in executive function (Robbins
2000). Some researchers also feel that ‘theory of mind’ development came about in humans
from increased volume/connectivity in the frontal lobes (Stuss, et al. 2001; Bird, et al. 2004).
Bauman & Kemper (1985) studied the brain of a postmortem 29-year-old autistic
subject and found that, compared to a normal control subject, several brain areas were
abnormal in the autistic man: the hippocampus, subiculum, entorhinal cortex, septal nuclei,
mamillary body, amygdala, neocerebellar cortex, roof nuclei of the cerebellum, and inferior
olivary nucleus. Another study showed a decrease in dendritic branching in the CA1 and CA4
regions of the hippocampus (Raymond, et al. 1989).
Fine, et al. (2001) studied a subject B.M. who had damage to the left amygdala, as this structure
has been implicated in ‘theory of mind’ function. By adulthood, B.M. had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia and Asperger’s syndrome. These researchers tested B.M.’s executive function
(planning, etc.) and ‘theory of mind’ abilities and found that these functions are impaired
versus normal people. For details on the ﬁndings of this study see Appendix B.
Abnormal histology in the amygdala, hippocampus, and entorhinal cortex suggests that
people with autism should suﬀer from decreased working memory capacity and the evidence
for this is considerable (Hughes, et al. 1994; Pennington & Ozonoﬀ 1996; Bennetto, et al.
1996; Ciesielski & Harris 1997; Minshew, et al. 1997).
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Research has also implicated working memory in executive functions such as planning
and decision making—functions that are impaired in autism (Carpenter, et al. 2000). Recent
studies show that brain areas traditionally associated with working memory (generally the
medial-temporal lobe structures) work with cortical areas to modulate working memory
phenomena. These cortical areas include the left frontal gyrus, superior parietal lobes, cingulate
gyrus, and occipital cortices (Baker, et al. 1996; Osaka, et al. 2004).
Luna, et al. (2002) used fMRI to study spatial working memory in autistic subjects,
and found that autistic subjects showed decreased activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and posterior cingulate gyrus versus normal controls.
This neuroscience research combined with the quantiﬁcation hypothesis provides a
unique insight into the autistic condition. The neuroscience data point to disturbances in the
neural structures that mediate working memory and the quantiﬁcation hypothesis actually
supports this conclusion: quantiﬁcation should demand more working memory space than
non-quantiﬁcational operations.
Linguistic and behavioral operations that involve quantiﬁcation require greater
working memory resources, as more variables are involved—quantiﬁcation operations require
temporary memory storage of qualia before a hypothesis concerning the association of those
qualia can be posited. For example, a ‘theory of mind’ task like the one in Figure 2.19 requires
(1) temporary storage of John’s qualia (frowning, angry tone of voice, impatient), (2) retrieval
(from long-term memory stores) and temporary working memory storage of associations those
qualia have with mental states, and (3) working memory must be allocated to posit possible
associations between John’s observed qualia and his possible mental states.
With this evidence for disruption of working memory in autism, the real question is what
the abnormal areas share in common, especially with respect to late neural development.

4.3. CONCLUSION. Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to describe and, to some degree,
explain the nature of the autistic language deﬁcit. I have posited a new hypothesis of autistic
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language from my observations of previous research, and I have tested this hypothesis with
my own research. Hopefully, this thesis has provided a foundation which will guide future
investigations into the nature of autistic cognition.
The theoretical and experimental tools are at our disposal to unravel the complexities
of autism into a single, uniﬁed theory—a theory which can eventually identify the etiology
of autism and perhaps provide a cure. A uniﬁed theory of autism will require the use of
theoretical and experimental tools in concert; experimental methods alone are simply stabs in
the dark, and theory devoid of empirical tests is pure conjecture. Sadly, many investigations
rely on one of these methods to the exclusion of the other.

4.3.1. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF AUTISTIC LANGUAGE.

1. I have analyzed past research and recognized, for the ﬁrst time, a common, speciﬁc characteristic
that, with the publication of this thesis, could greatly increase general understanding of autistic
language.

2. I have drawn a correlation between behavioral operations (like planning and counterfactual
reasoning) and linguistic functions (such as tense marking, modality, negation, and prosody)—
an observation which, to my knowledge, has not been made before.

3. I have tested this hypothesis for validity with syntactic and morphological analyses.

4. I have provided the ﬁrst generalized and comprehensive analysis of autistic language/
behavior.

4.4. FURTHER RESEARCH. The hypothesis outlined in this thesis must be systematically tested for
validity, and this testing should ﬁrst proceed in three particular areas of language—phonology,
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morphology, and syntax. Studies in this area should ﬁrst test autistic against normal subjects,
then autistic versus mentally retarded subjects to determine what properties are truly unique
to autism.
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APPENDIX A
DATA FROM THE POS STUDY. Appendix A provides some of the data from the POS study in
Chapter 3. Each subject’s data is listed with frequency of POS occurrence on the left and POS
on the right.
A.1. AUTISTIC SUBJECT DATA.
A.1.1. BRETT.
5084 noun
1420 verb
1158 detr
521 comp
496 prep
334 adjt
260 modl
200 inﬂ
138 advb
76 quan
26 nega
A.1.2. JACK.
3977 noun
852 verb
425 detr
302 comp
262 prep
240 adjt
149 inﬂ
115 advb
101 modl
29 quan
14 nega
A.1.3. MARK.
5891 noun
701 verb
376 detr
310 prep
267 adjt
171 comp
87 nega
77 quan
66 advb
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42 modl
22 inﬂ
A.1.4. RICK.
3412 noun
914 verb
756 detr
152 adjt
141 comp
119 prep
87 advb
63 quan
59 modl
21 inﬂ
13 nega
A.1.5. ROGER.
3640 noun
1115 verb
675 detr
368 comp
249 adjt
183 prep
144 modl
98 advb
73 inﬂ
39 quan
5 nega
A.1.6. STUART.
1438 noun
206 verb
37 adjt
34 comp
29 modl
27 detr
23 quan
21 prep
18 advb
1 inﬂ
0 nega
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A.2. DOWN’S SUBJECT DATA.
A.2.1. BILLY.
5330 noun
759 verb
452 detr
338 comp
270 adjt
127 advb
124 prep
111 quan
60 modl
40 inﬂ
7 nega
A.2.2. CHARLES.
1528 noun
101 comp
61 verb
56 adjt
50 quan
43 detr
26 advb
7 prep
5 modl
2 inﬂ
0 nega
A.2.3. JERRY.
5065 noun
846 verb
840 detr
736 comp
345 prep
231 adjt
108 advb
103 quan
83 modl
63 inﬂ
44 nega
A.2.4. KATE.
1861 noun
360 verb
229 detr

83

122
118
83
55
41
31
16
2

comp
prep
adjt
modl
advb
inﬂ
quan
nega

A.2.5. MARTIN.
4920 noun
645 comp
398 verb
349 detr
213 adjt
127 advb
106 prep
98 quan
84 modl
30 nega
5 inﬂ
A.2.6. PENNY.
3350 noun
618 verb
432 detr
369 comp
243 prep
153 advb
130 adjt
100 modl
83 inﬂ
46 quan
16 nega
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APPENDIX B
THE FINDINGS OF A STUDY CONCERNING B.M. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the
ﬁndings of Fine, et al. 2001 concerning a subject, B.M. with damage to the left amygdala. This
study shows many strong correlations between B.M. and the symptoms of autism, suggesting
that these symptoms may also be attributed to amygdala damage.
B.1. FINE, ET AL. 2001.
Executive function was determined by three criteria: ‘inhibition (the ability to suppress
a habitual response), intentionality (the creation and maintenance of goal-related behaviors),
and executive memory (temporal sequencing)’.
One of the tasks measuring inhibition was the Stroop task (Stroop 1935). In one
version of the Stroop task, the subject sits in front of a computer screen and words written in
diﬀerent colors are displayed, one at a time, on the monitor; the subject then pronounces the
word as quickly as possible. For example, if the word ‘green’ were displayed on the monitor,
then the subject would pronounce the word. The word ‘green’ might be highlighted in any
of several colors, and the accuracy and reaction time are recorded by the investigator. Notice
that the diﬃculty of correctly pronouncing the word increases when the word is displayed in a
diﬀerent color than what the word represents.
One of the intentionality tests administered to B.M. was the ‘Tower of London’ task.
In this task the subject is given three pegs with an arrangement of three diﬀerent-sized rings in
a conﬁguration. The subject is then given a picture of the goal conﬁguration and the time and
number of steps are recorded for the subject to get to that goal state. This eﬀectively assesses a
subject’s ability to create and follow a plan in achieving a goal.
Executive memory describes the ability to shift attention from one line of thinking to
another. The Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) is performed with a pack of sixty cards, each
of which has either a triangle, star, cross, or circle, in one of four colors (red, green, yellow, or
blue). Each card in the pack is unique. The examiner instructs the subject to put the cards,
one at a time, under four sample cards. The tester either approves or disapproves of each card
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placement by the subject; and the subject must use this information (approval or disapproval)
to infer the sorting rule. After the subject has determined the correct rule and correctly placed
ten consecutive cards, the rule is changed and the subject must reanalyze her/his approach.
The required rule sequence for the test is (1) color, (2) form, and ﬁnally (3) number. The
task is scored by the number of correct strategies inferred with the pack of cards (Saper, et al.
2000: 358). In this way the WCST assesses a subject’s ability to reanalyze in the midst of everchanging circumstances.
‘Theory of mind’ was assessed through false belief, joke comprehension, and non-literal
utterance comprehension tests. In false belief tasks a subject is asked to predict the purpose
of a story character’s actions based on the character’s erroneous beliefs. For example, a subject
might be told that a character ‘Josh’ thinks that the milk is in the refrigerator, but the subject
knows that Josh’s mom moved the milk to the cupboard. The interviewer then asks the subject
where Josh will go to look for the milk. The subject’s success at this task is dependent on her
ability to ‘put herself in Josh’s shoes’, an ability referred to as ‘theory of mind’.
In joke comprehension tests the subject is given cartoons, which, to be properly
understood, require an awareness of the mental states of the characters.
A non-literal comprehension task tests the subject’s ability to understand sarcasm. This
task is relevant, as it requires the ability to grasp the speaker’s thoughts/intentions. ‘For example,
the listener can only reject the literal interpretation of “You’re looking smart tonight, Frank” if
the hearer knows that the speaker thinks that Frank looks scruﬀy’. If the listener/subject takes
the speaker’s thoughts/mental states into account, then she will correctly comprehend the nonliteral/sarcastic nature of the utterance, but if the subject does not grasp the speaker’s mental
states, she will interpret the speaker’s utterance literally.
B.M. performed well on executive function tasks, but poorly on ‘theory of mind’
assessments, which suggests that the amygdala is not solely responsible for executive function,
but is responsible for ‘theory of mind’ abilities.
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ENDNOTES
∆P = 2(log(frequency))
To learn more see The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html).
3
The CHILDES database is available at http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/.
4
This structure shares remarkable similarities to the basic structure of propositions in Intentional logic/
Montague semantics, which combines Modal logic with ‘propositional attitudes’ (ex. believe that p, hope that p,
etc.). These similarities underscore the usefulness of semantic theory in describing cognitive phenomena.
5
For more information on hypothetical or abductive inference, see Peirce 1931-1958:2.624.
6
See Section 2.5.1 for more about negation and quantiﬁcation.
7
These data are available from the CHILDES website (http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/).
8
For more information or to download QTAG (Version 3.1), see http://web.bham.ac.uk/o.mason/software/
tagger/.
9
Prepositions and negation because they can c-command either a verb or a noun.
1
2
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